Advisory · CVE-2026-37171 Assigned by MITRE Enriched by NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-37171Cross-tenant session trust in SuperTokens Core
Core honors a session’s embedded tenant claim without checking it against the tenant context of the request. A token minted for one tenant is accepted by another — so the single promise of multitenancy, that one tenant cannot reach another’s data, does not hold.
At a glance
| CVE | CVE-2026-37171 — assigned by MITRE, 18 June 2026 |
|---|---|
| Class | Tenant isolation failure · CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) |
| Severity | 9.6 Critical CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N · CVSS 4.0: 9.3 |
| Affected | SuperTokens Core v6.0.0 through v11.4.0 |
| Vendor | SuperTokens Inc. |
| Vector | Network · multitenant · requires any tenant holding a valid session |
| Status | Disclosed under coordinated disclosure · 90-day window elapsed · CVE assigned |
| Researcher | Drew Morana (@dmorana) · Whitenbaker Labs |
The promise under test
Multitenancy makes one promise: a tenant cannot reach another tenant’s data. This advisory is a place where it does not hold — a valid session on any tenant is accepted as authority over every other tenant on the same Core.
What goes wrong
Core reads the tenant from the tId claim inside the session token, not from the tenant in the request path. Every tenant on a Core instance shares the same signing key, so a token minted for Tenant A carries a valid signature when it is presented to Tenant B. The signature checks out, the claim is trusted, and the request is served against the wrong tenant.
Three scenarios were confirmed on a test instance, each returning 200 OK:
- AVerify a Tenant A token through a Tenant B endpoint200 OK
- BRead another tenant’s stored session data200 OK
- CRegenerate a validly signed JWT with attacker-supplied claims200 OK
The mitigation that doesn’t mitigate
API-key authentication does not close it. Every operation above was reconfirmed with a valid API key enforced. An API key controls who can reach Core; it does not bind an operation to a tenant, which is the boundary that fails here.
Related findings
Confirmed on the same instance, same root cause
| Cross-tenant user hijack | CWE-863 | CVSS 6.5 |
| Cross-tenant password-reset token consumption | CWE-863 | CVSS 7.4 |
| Cross-tenant role injection | CWE-863 | CVSS 6.5 |
| Unauthenticated metadata and MFA read/write in default configuration | CWE-306 | CVSS 6.5 |
Impact
For v6.0.0 through v11.4.0, the tenant-isolation promise of multitenancy does not hold.
An operator running multiple tenants on one Core faces cross-tenant data exposure, account hijacking, and role injection — reachable by any party holding a valid session on any single tenant. The attacker does not need to be privileged; they need only to be a legitimate user of one tenant on the shared instance.
Disclosure timeline
- Mar 2026Disclosed to SuperTokens. Coordinated disclosure opens a 90-day window.
- Mar 2026Vendor response. SuperTokens proposes API-key authentication as a mitigation.
- Mar 2026Follow-up. Every operation reconfirmed with a valid API key enforced — the issue persists.
- 18 Jun 2026MITRE assigns CVE-2026-37171.
- Jun 2026Public advisory published after the 90-day window elapsed.
Remediation
No vendor patch or fixed version is recorded for the affected range. Operators running an affected version of SuperTokens Core in a multitenant configuration should treat tenant isolation as not enforced by Core and contact Whitenbaker Labs for remediation guidance.
